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PLANNING FOR FLIGHT SYSTEM AVAILABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
C. L. Proctor and R. S. Leavenworth 
University of Florida
The prime problem of planning for air­ 
craft availability is to economically 
evaluate and determine if system avail­ 
abilities are continuously being achieved, 
as well as to identify availability prob­ 
lems and pinpoint where they exist. 
The risk to human life and property is 
far too great to warrant the use of struc­ 
tural components which may cause vital 
equipment to fail when most needed.
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
One of the principal functions of the 
engineering sciences is to develop mathe­ 
matical models to represent the processes 
of natural or expected occurrences, there­ 
by reducing great quantities of experi­ 
mental data to simple relations between 
variables and permitting a unification of 
apparently diverse phenomena. A good 
model will include the most important 
features of the process, be mathematically 
simple (if possible), involve a minimum 
of assumptions, and be fruitful for pur­ 
poses of prediction control and theoreti­ 
cal speculation.
The acid test of any model is its 
approximation to reality, subject to em­ 
pirical observations. Unless the model 
corresponds reasonably well to physical 
observations, it can serve no practical 
purpose.
Occasionally, more than one model may 
be developed that accounts equally well 
for the observational data obtained from 
a system's test. In this case, and until 
the experimental results are sufficiently 
refined to favor one hypothesis over the 
others, the choice of models can be a 
matter of personal taste. Usually, pre­ 
ference is given to the simplest of 
several alternative hypotheses.
To illustrate the development and use 
of a relatively simple mathematical model 
consider a fleet of exactly m aircraft 
in which malfunctioning equipments are 
instrument monitored. All other preven­ 
tive maintenance activities are performed 
outside the scheduled flight operating 
times of the aircraft and do not inter­ 
fere with availability. Suppose the mean 
arrival rate for repair for each aircraft 
in operation is X, and the mean repair 
rate is y . Repair priorities are such 
that immediate repair service is initia­ 
ted for any fleet aircraft that is tem­ 
porarily out of operation. It is assumed 
that aircraft beyond repair are immedi­ 
ately replaced to keep the combined total 
number that are in operation and in re­ 
pair to the number m.
Let P n (t) be the probability of n air­ 
craft out of operation at time t. Ob­ 
serve that since 0<JP n (t)_<l and
m
Z pn<t> = 1,
n = 0
relatively simple relationships can be 
subsequently developed, 2 i.e., equations 
d,a,b,c) :
P o (t+At) = P Q (t)[l-mXAt]+P i (t)yAt (l,a) 
P n (t+At) = P n (t)[l-(m-n)XAt](1-nyAt)
+ P n _i(t) (m-n-fl)XAt
+ P n+lU) (n+l)yAt ,m>n>0 , (l,b> 
P m (t+At)=Pm (t)(l-myAt)+P ra_i(t)XAt, (l,c)
where (m-n)XAt and nyAt are the probab­ 
ilities of exactly one aircraft in need 
of repair and one service completion res­ 
pectively, during the increment of time 
At in the interval [t,t+At]; where n is 
the number in repair at time t.
If in each of the equations (l,a,b,c) 
the appropriate Pn (t)(n = 0 , 1,. . . ,m) is sub­ 
tracted from both sides and the equation 
is divided by At (in the limit as At->0 
the left side is the derivative, Pn (t)) 
the equations become:
Pj(t) = -mXP 0 (t)+yP 1 (t) (2,a)
pA(t) = -C(m-n)X+ny]Pn (t)
+(m-n+l)XPn-i(t)+(n+l)yPn+1 (t), (2,b)
0<n<m,
P^(t) = -myPm (t)+XPm_ 1 (t). (2,c)
These linear differential equations 
which are functions of t, are first order 
difference equations with respect to n; 
hence are called linear differential 
difference equations. For the initial 
conditions P 0 (t=0)=l, and Pn (t=0)=0, 
0<n<m, the Laplace transformation 3 yields
(s+mX)P 0 (s) = 1-HyP^s) (3,a) 
[s+(m-n)X+ny]Pn (s) = (m-n+1)XPn-1 (s)
+(n+l)yPn+1 (s) (3,b) 
(s+my)Pm (s) = XPm_ 1 (s) (3»c)
Since steady state conditions are of 
greater interest than short operating 
time, only steady state relationships 
will be pursued here.
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By means of the z-generating transfor­ 
mation 4 of (3,a,b,c) and application of 
the Laplace transform final value theorem 
allows the reduction of equations (3,a,b, 
c) to
lim sdP(s,z)/dz=dP(z) /dz=mXP(z) /(y+Xz)
hence integration for P(z=l)=l yields
P(z) = [(y+Xz)/(y+X)] m . (4)
The inverse z-generating transform of 
equation (4), i.e.,
P(z)z
yieIds
P« = (5)
The expected number of aircraft out of 
operation at any one time can be readily 
obtained by differentiating the z-genera­ 
ting transform P(z) with respect to z 
for z->l; yie Iding
m
P' (z = l) = £ nPn=E(n) 
n = 0
. .E(n) mX/(y+X). (6)
The mean time between repairs for the air­ 
craft can be shown to be
E(t r ) = E(n)/X = m/(y+X). (7)
Similar to equation (6), the variance 
of the number of aircraft out of opera­ 
tion, Cf n 2 , can be obtained by the 
following:
hence
p"( 2 =l)+P' (z = l)-[
= mXy/(y+X) : (8)
From the mean number of failures E(n) 
and the variance in the number of fail­ 
ures an 2 given by equations (6) and (8), 
control limited can be established so as 
to form a control limit. If the level of 
significance is set to correspond to 
three standard deviations, the upper con­ 
trol limit UCLn = E(n)-H3an and the lower 
control limit LCLn = E(n)-3an , hence
UCLr
and
[mX+3/mXy]/(X+y)
LCLn = [mX-3/mXy ] ,'
(9,a) 
(9,b)
The ideal flight system maintenance and 
rework program would have all of its rele­ 
vant resources focused to yield the maxi­ 
mum availability of all pertinent air­ 
craft at minimal cost. The development 
and implementation of such a program re­ 
quires that all resources and their inter­ 
actions be clearly defined in order to 
specify their functional relationships. 
Since any aircraft with structural fail­ 
ures or those scheduled for regular main­ 
tenance action will be restored to flight 
operation in a finite span of time, the 
best figure of merit in general is the
flight system's "availability." Any 
system's availability is defined as the 
probability that the system is in an 
acceptable state at any time t, given 
that the system was fully operating at 
time zero.
Since the availability of the fleet of 
aircraft is based upon, say, having k or 
less aircraft out of operation, then the 
availability is simply
k
Availability = ]T P 
n = 0 ra " n
Even though equation (10) was developed 
for steady state conditions, this defini­ 
tion still holds, because of the long 
term averaging effect.
SYSTEM AVAILABILITY
The availability of a flight system 
may be defined as the fraction of time 
that it is able or available to perform 
assigned flight duties, even though the 
availability of a complex system may be 
a function of several variables. These 
include such things as circuit reliabili­ 
ty, total system maintainability, en­ 
vironmental stability, and fail-safe 
capability. All of these are important 
and must be carefully weighed to deter­ 
mine a system's feasibility and the 
economics of its performance. It is 
sometimes possible to have excellent 
reliability and yet have very poor main­ 
tainability, resulting in poor avail­ 
ability. Another example of limited 
availability is where a high reliability 
figure is evident, but pertains only to 
very narrow and restrictive environmental 
conditions. Thus one must carefully 
evaluate each performance factor in esti­ 
mating the availability as a figure of 
meri t .
Of all other considerations, costs of 
availability may be of prime concern in 
determining the optimum combination of 
availability levels necessary to achieve 
a particular objective.
As a simple illustration, consider the 
case of two independent variables, when 
it is desired to find the maximum avail­ 
ability combination for a fixed total 
expenditure by calculating a number of 
feasible input combinations that would 
yield the same total cost. It is con­ 
ceivable in general to express the avail­ 
ability function mathematically and then 
to find an optimum by some mathematical 
procedure.
For simplicity, consider the case in 
which the availability is a function of 
two inputs, design time T and operating 
time t, which have unit cost rates Cj 
and C 2 respectively. Suppose that there 
is also a fixed cost C Q for all the other 
input factors which are fixed. Consider, 
i.e. , the availability function which is 
simply the reliability for a non-maintained
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system and is given by 
A(T,t) - (11)
where k is a proportionality constant. 
(Note that the maintenance policy in this 
case does not interfere with the opera­ 
ting times in which the system is avail­ 
able.) The total cost C(T,t) could be,
C(T,t) = C 0 +C ie Vi +C 2 t. 
where V is a time constant.
(12)
The mathematical objective is to maxi­ 
mize the availability A(T,t) for a fixed 
total budget, i.e., for a constant value 
of C(T,t) = K where K is a constant.
The maximum availability can be found 
if the constant cost function is re­ 
arranged so that
C 0 +C 1 e VT +C 2 t-K = 0
This permits the reliability function to 
be written as
A(T,t,X) = e -kt/T
VT, (13)
simply by tacking on the parametric form 
of the constant cost function.
Now to find the maximum availability, 
given the cost restriction, proceed with 
the standard method of differentiating 
partially with respect to each variable 
T, t, and X, and set the partial deriva­ 
tives equal to zero. The results are: 
,-kt/T
j——— + Xc Ve = 0 (14,a)
8A/3t=-ke ~ kt/T XC,
= C 0 +C 1 e VT+C 2 t-K = 0
(14,b)
(14,c)
This gives a system of three equations, 
(14,a,b,c), which can be solved for the 
three unknowns T, t and X. This method 
is due to Lagrange, and the parameter X 
is generally called a Lagrangian Multi­ 
plier. This method can be extended to 
include a great many variables which may 
be relevant to the equation and its con­ 
straints, assuming that the total cost 
function is continuous and differentiable 
and that an optimum actually exists. 
However, as the number of independent 
variables increases, the number of equa­ 
tions to be solved increases. Moreover, 
the equations are generally nonlinear, 
as is our case in this simple example.
Hence, the computation may become ex­ 
tremely difficult, and for a large number 
of variables and/or constraints, prac­ 
tically impossible.
It is for this reason steady state 
models are used for a first approximation.
Another important modeling considera­ 
tion, especially during the design or 
modification phase of an aircraft, is the 
reliability of its structural components.
STEADY STATE STRUCTURAL - RELIABILITY
In almost all practical situations, 
the load applied to a specific aircraft 
structural component or number varies, 
sometimes over very wide ranges. For 
example, the mission of most military 
aircraft involves landing and taking off, 
weapons being fired, the variation in 
conditions of aerodynamic loading, etc. 
Suppose experimentally an expression is 
found for the probability that a particu­ 
lar structural component has a strength 
s Q (psi) or greater. NOTE: these could 
be expressed as total stress values, i.e. 
in g's (ft per sec 2 .) If the probability 
density function (p.d.f.) for the compo­ 
nents strength is denoted by f c (s), the 
probability of failure for a stress 
larger than S Q will be
/ f c (s)ds (15)
If f^s) represents the p.d.f. for en­ 
vironmental load stresses, the probability 
of encountering a stress in the immediate 
neighborhood of S Q is given by f L (s 0 )As, 
where As is a small interval about the 
point S Q . Therefore, if the stress is 
in the infinitesimal neighborhood of s , 
the reliability of the component is given 
by the product
[f L (s Q )As] I f c (s)ds
Finally, if S Q is allowed to range over 
all possible (i.e., positive) values, we 
have m m
reliability= f c (s)ds f L (s 0 )ds 0 (16)
which can be expressed in several alter­ 
native forms :mm " o
reliability
and
unreli abili ty
(s n )ds n (17,a)
oo S
=/[/fL (s 0 )ds 0J f c (s)ds (17, b)
An equation which represents a probab­ 
ility density function for a chain 
strength (identical links) and can be ap­ 
plied much the same as for link strengths, 
the p.d.f. for chain strength, which can 
be denoted by f n (s), is
-j
f L ( 8 ) (18)
Equation (16) is a special case of (18) 
for the case when n is unity. Equation 
(18), being the p.d.f. for chain strengths, 
can now be combined with the p.d.f. for 
environmental stress to obtain chain re­ 
liability just as obtained for link reli­ 
ability. Therefore,
chain reliability = 
s
n L / f C (s)dsJ f C (s) ds(19)
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Since the equation derived above for 
chain reliability is fairly complex, it 
may be useful to follow a brief discuss­ 
ion of three limiting cases:
1. aL«ac
2. a c «aL
3. OL-OC
where 0-r and a^ refer to the standard 
deviations in environmental stress and 
link strength respectively. Let us con­ 
sider these three cases individually.
1. In this case the environmental stress­ 
es are restricted to a narrow range of 
values (to one value in the limit CT-r-^0). 
The reliability of the chain is thus de­ 
pendent almost entirely on the variability 
of the links; in particular, the prob­ 
ability that no one link in a chain has a 
strength less than the given value of 
environmental stress. In the limit, as 
0L-*0 , the chain reliability is given by 
R = rn , the product rule, where R and r 
represent the system and component reli­ 
abilities, respectively.
2. In this case the link strengths are 
restricted to a narrow range of values 
(to one value in the limit O c ->0) . The 
reliability of the chain depends almost 
entirely on the probability of occurrence 
of an environmental stress exceeding the 
given value of link strength. Since all 
links have sensibly the same strength, 
chain reliability is thus given (in the 
limit, as CJ C ->0) by the reliability of a 
single link: R = r.
3. When ^^—OQ, chain reliability will lie 
somewhere between the two limiting cases 
discussed above.
These results, although based on a 
somewhat idealized and over-simplified 
model, serve to explain a common observa­ 
tion: to wit, that the product rule gen­ 
erally tends to give a pessimistic pre­ 
diction. For components manufactured 
under carefully controlled conditions we 
might expect the case CT C »CTL , and there­ 
fore we might expect the formula R=rn to 
predict, in many cases, a value of system 
reliability lower than that observed in 
actual test.
It is intuitively clear that the great­ 
er the amount of overlap between the curves 
fL'(s) and £Q(S), the larger the prob­ 
ability of failure will be. A rough idea 
of the magnitude of this effect can be 
obtained by assuming that both fL(s) and 
fc(s) are normal distributions with the 
same value of the standard deviation cr.*
*This assumption and the numbers that fol­ 
low must be regarded with caution since 
it is to be expected that the dispersion 
of the environmental stresses (more or less 
uncontrolled) will be larger--perhaps much 
1arger~~than the dispersion of component 
strengths (carefully controlled during 
the manufacturing or rework process.)
Under this assumption, if the two curves 
coincide, the probability of success will 
be 50 per cent. If the means of the two 
distributions are separated by 4a, the 
probability of success will be approxi­ 
mately 99.8 per cent. If the means are 
separated by 6a, the probability of suc­ 
cess will be approximately 99.998 per 
cent. If a piece of equipment is being 
designed for 95 per cent reliability, it 
is clear that such a large separation of 
means (sometimes called the safety margin) 
will not be necessary. Despite this, 
several writers on reliability persist 
in promulgating the view that if a safety 
margin of 3a is good, a safety margin of 
6(7 is better, and a safety margin of 60a 
is better yet, and so on, ad infinitum. 
Safety margins cost money, and, after a 
certain point, a minute improvement in 
reliability can be purchased only by an 
astronomical expenditure of funds.
Having stated the interaction between 
a single environmental stress and the 
performance of a component in mathemati­ 
cal terms, we can now proceed to incor­ 
porate this concept into a model for the 
reliability of a complex system. For 
this purpose we introduce the model of a 
chain with n links. The links are assum­ 
ed to have negligible weight.
In the context of our chain example the 
components become links in the chain, and 
the environmental stresses become weights 
that are hung from the end of the chain. 
The success of any particular link is 
judged by its ability to withstand, with- 
our breaking, the stress of some randomly 
selected weight. Similar considerations 
apply to a chain of n links.
Since the probability that any given 
component link has a strength s or 
greater is given by
P r (s>S 0 ) /f c (s)ds
the probability that a chain of n such 
links has a strength s 0 or greater is 
provided by the expression
I f f c (s)dsj
For structural chains or any structural 
member on which independent failure would 
constitute system failure, the product of 
independent component reliabilities would 
yield the system reliability. For ex­ 
ample, consider a system in which the 
reliability for each of n components or 
subsystems can be considered independent, 
the system reliability can be expressed as
n
system reliability = II R^(t) (20)
where each Ri(t) may be changing with 
time. In a similar way, where all redun­ 
dant components or subsystems are util­ 
ized, the system reliability can be ex­ 
pressed in terms of unreliability, e.g., 
sy s tern n 
reliability = 1 -fl (l-R i (s))
1 - U-R(t) ] n (21)
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In the case of the independent or chain 
failure such as equations (20) and (21), 
the reasoning is that if any one of the 
n links should break, the chain itself 
will fail. Furthermore, the links are 
assumed to fail independently of each 
other, which must be very nearly true for 
approximately weightless links.
In spite of benefits obtained from 
mathematical models which assist in de­ 
signing failure free flight systems, ob­ 
jections may be raised, in that reli­ 
ability is an expensive proposition. 
Hence, a cost effectiveness study may be 
required for any complex reliability 
s tudy.
COST EFFECTIVENESS
A simple generalized total expected 
cost model for an aircraft system which 
is a function of time t, can be expressed 
as
E[C(t)]=C 0 [l-R(t)]+a(t)
where: C Q =Purchase cost
C Q R(t)=expected present value after 
time t; where R(0)=l and R(t) 
is a reliability (cumulative 
probability) function
a( t)=expected accumulation costs of 
repairs and maintenance where 
a(0)=0.
Since E[C(t)] can only be expected to 
increase with time, its minimum value is 
at time zero; hence it becomes important 
to look at minimizing the expected cost 
rate, which can be expressed as
C R (t) = E[ C (t)]/t
= [C 0 (l-R(t))+a(t)]/t.
Hence the minimum expected cost rate for 
the system is given for
C^(t) = 0.
A typical form for R(t) and a(t) are 
R(t)=e~ At and a(t)=k(e ufc -1), where X rep­ 
resents breakdown rate, y represents re­ 
pair rate, and k an arbitrary constant.
Hence
C R (t)=[C 0 (l-e~ At )+k(e Ut -l)]/t
A trial and error solution might be the 
expedient approach to the solution for t 
by settling C^(t)=0. This would yield 
the time when the cost rate would be ex­ 
pected to start increasing and continue 
to do so regardless of availability and 
other important considerations.
Since certain flight systems are de­ 
signed on a basis of "4-g" maximum accel­ 
eration and if monitoring accelerometer 
readings exceed "6-g", it seems most ur­ 
gent to explore the correlation between 
structural failures and aircraft having 
excessive accelerometer readings. Like­ 
wise, for hard landings, since flight 
systems are designed for a maximum sink­ 
ing speed, where records indicate air­ 
craft with excessive sinking speeds in 
landing, all such specific aircraft should 
be studied for failure correlations.
If the sensitivity of accelerometers 
make this impractical and are locked out 
on landings, a more rugged counter type 
accelerometer should be installed on 
each aircraft for this purpose.
Further consideration needs to be given 
to implementing a number of monitoring 
devices or plans to test for structural 
failures throughout the critical compo­ 
nents of the aircraft.
In many flight situations, the failure 
of system units during actual flight 
operation is not only costly but danger­ 
ous. If the flight system unit is charac­ 
terized by a failure rate that increases 
with age, it may be wise to replace it 
before it has aged for too long a time.
Maintenance is a highly important as­ 
pect of availability. But it is another 
matter to keep an aircraft operating re­ 
liably by proper maintenance practices. 
If simulate details are considered necess­ 
ary to an availability study relevant to 
a large number of attributes which are 
functions of several variables, the Monte 
Carlo simulation method is sometimes the 
only s oluti on .
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION FOR AVAILABILITY
In the Monte Carlo technique we "play a 
game" with nature. If certain elements 
of a problem follow known probabilistic 
laws, we can sample randomly from the cor­ 
responding distributions to obtain, not a 
deterministic solution to our problem, 
but rather an overall distribution repre­ 
senting the statistical behavior of the 
solution we desire.
The application to availability is fair­ 
ly new. The Monte Carlo technique has 
been applied for a longer period to prob­ 
lems in mathematics (solutions of certain 
differential-integral equations), to 
problems in physics (neutron diffusion), 
and to war games. We impose a specified 
input, use some random processes to select 
values of component parameters, and combine 
these according to some rule to obtain 
the system output. Repeating this pro­ 
cess will yield a sample of outputs from 
which availability data may be deduced.
1. A suitable random process must be 
available. This is no problem: any good 
tabulation of random numbers will suffice.
2. Enough component information must be 
on hand so that component response dis­ 
tributions can be estimated with reason­ 
able accuracy. These response distribu­ 
tions tell us how to weight the various 
probabilities of occurrence of parametric 
values.
3. A formula must be available giving 
system output as a function of system in­ 
put and component parameters.
Consider a simple example, based on the 
generation of random numbers. 5 Associa­ 
ted with each number is the resulting 
condition obtained corresponding to
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this number.
Figure 1 illustrates the case where 80 
per cent of the time a "go" condition ex­ 
ists and 20 per cent of the time a "no go' 
condition exists. That is, the probabil­ 
ity of obtaining a "go" condition is .8 
and the probability of a "no go" is .2.
..0
go'
conditi ons 
ob t aine d , , ,/~ "no go
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Per cent likelihood of occurrence 
Fig. 1
Suppose the random numbers vary from 1 
to 1000, each having equal likelihood. 
Then "go" action is taken when the random 
numbers generated is from 1 to 800, where­ 
as, if any number from 801 to 1000 is gen­ 
erated, "no go" action is taken.
By means of simulation using a high 
speed digital computer, it is possible to 
apply the Monte Carlo method in deter­ 
mining the average conditions which a set 
of probability distributions approach in 
the limit.
Figure 2 shows a procedure for the 
checkout and flight of a simple system.
Reliability estimated by the Monte Carlo 
method is done by taking the ratio of the 
number of successful simulation runs and 
the total number of simulation runs. It 
therefore becomes necessary to run the 
same situation many times using the same 
probability distribution but varying the 
given set of random numbers used to gen­ 
erate probabilities, etc. The estimated 
reliability which is obtained from the 
ratio "number of successful simulation 
runs/total number of simulation runs" is 
subject to the usual statistical error. 
It is therefore desirable to determine 
the number of simulation runs necessary 
based on the degree of accuracy required 
in the reliability estimate. According 
to Chestnut, 5 the number of runs may be 
determined from the formula:
N 3.84R(1-R)/E 2
whe re
N = number of runs
R = checkout reliability
E = acceptable error range for per cent 
confidence in estimating reliability 
R. (A 95 per cent confidence level 
was used for this example.)
receive equipment 
___5 sub systems_____
checkout equipment 1 
3 subsystems
checkout equipment 2 
2 s ub sys terns
delay time
mate equipment into system
[checkout system I
transport system
delay time
checkout total system
[ flight
I
Fig. 2
In Table 1 is shown the result of 200 
simulation runs using Monte Carlo methods 
on an example in which a total system 
consisted of five subsystems was tested. 
On comparing the simulation runs with the 
expected number of runs and the Monte 
Carlo estimated reliability with that 
computed analytically, it is clear that 
the Monte Carlo method could be used 
effectively to estimate a system's per­ 
formance. The significance of these re­ 
sults could also be checked by a rerun 
of the simulation or by using a differ­ 
ent set of random numbers.
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RESULTS OF 200 MONTE CARLO SIMULATION RUNS
Sub sys tern
Total 
System
Number of runs 
System working 200 200 169 106 200 86
Expected number 
of runs 200 200 163 119 200 97
Reliability 
(Monte Carlo 
es timate d)
1.000 1.000 0. 845 0 .530 1.000 0.430
Reliability 
(Analyti cally 
calculated)
1.000 1.000 0. 816 0.597 1.000 0.487
Table
In conclusion, there is little doubt 
that future flight systems will be re­ 
quired to perform many new and compli­ 
cated functions not yet conceived or de­ 
vised. The advent of more complex flight 
and space vehicles will demand much more 
sophisticated systems for communication, 
traffic control, support equipment, i.e., 
ground handling and maintenance. The 
flight system availability problems are 
just now beginning; hence, many new tech­ 
niques will be needed in order to cope 
with each new problem as it occurs. It 
is felt that some of the concepts and 
methods presented here will play a part 
in the designs and operations of tomorrow's 
systems.
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